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CRISIS IN LEGAL SERVICES FOR THE POOR*
ROGER C. CRAMTON t

I. INTRODUCTION

P RESIDENT

REAGAN'S BUDGET SUBMISSION FOR 1982
alerted the nation that his Administration planned to abolish
the national legal services program.' The proposal, which would
take the federal government out of the business of providing poor
people with lawyers in civil cases, is certain to stimulate one of the
liveliest political controversies of the year,2 one in which we as
lawyers and potential lawyers have a special interest.
* This article was prepared from the fifth Donald A. Giannella Memorial
Lecture of the Villanova University School of Law, April 9, 1981.
It was a special honor for me to be invited to deliver this lecture because

Don Giannella was a colleague in the work of the Administrative Conference
of the United States in the early 1970's before his untimely death. He was a
man of quiet force, tremendous integrity, and great dedication to teaching and
scholarship.

tProfessor of Law, Cornell University Law School; formerly, Chairman of
the Board of Directors of the Legal Services Corporation, 1975-78, and member
of the Board, 1975-79. I am indebted to various friends and colleagues for
their helpful comments, especially Thomas Ehrlich, Steven Gold, Alan Houseman, and Richard Schmalbeck.
1. See Barbash, White House Wants to Cut Ofy Federal Legal Aid for the
Poor, Wash. Post, Mar. 6, 1981, § A, at 1, col. 5; Taylor, Administration Seeks
to Terminate U.S. Plan That Finances Legal Aid, N.Y. Times, Mar. 6, 1981,
§A, at 1, col. 2.
For the sake of convenience, material from the popular press will be cited
by both author and title. Further, where citations do not include a specific
page reference to the newspaper in which the source appears, a copy is on file
at the Villanova Law Library.
2. See Barbash, End to Legal Aid to Poor Opposed by ABA Chief, Wash.
Post, Mar. 7, 1981, § A, at 6, col. 1; Hume, Reagan Plan to Drop Legal Aid
Agency Assailed, L.A. Times, Mar. 8, 1981; Ranii & Bourne, Legal Services'
Last Gasp?, Nat'l. L.J., Mar. 23, 1981, at 1, cols. 1-2. Taylor, Bar Groups
Support Funds for Legal Aid, N.Y. Times, Mar. 11, 1981.

(521)
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Two recent reports, one prepared by the Heritage Foundation 8
and another by one of Mr. Reagan's transition teams,4 apparently
persuaded the new Administration that this national program is
one of the "principal federal instrumentalities by which the personnel and institutions of the ideological 'left' in American life
have been financed." 5 The image conveyed is of a program composed of left-wing lawyers, recently graduated from law school, engaged as self-appointed representatives of the poor in test cases and
class actions designed to erode the free enterprise system and to
establish a more complete welfare state. 6
Defenders of the legal services program say the Administration's proposal amounts to a denial of this nation's commitment to
equal justice under law - "putting a price tag on justice, just like a
Cadillac or a yacht," in the words of F. William McCalpin.7 Mr.
McCalpin is chairman of the board of the independent Legal Services Corporation, which administers the program, and secretary of
the American Bar Association, which has long supported it.
My purpose is to explore this debate.
II.

THE HISTORY OF CIVIL LEGAL ASSISTANCE

For most of our history, the situation with respect to civil legal
aid for the poor could well have been summed up in Anatole
France's famous gibe that: "The law, in its majestic equality, forbids the rich as well as the poor to sleep under bridges, to beg in
the streets, and to steal bread." s The courts were open to all, but
only the well-to-do could afford the lawyer who was necessary for
the vindication of rights.
3.

MANDATE
HERITAGE FOUNDATION,
REPORT ON THE POVERTY AGENCIES

FOR

LEADERSHIP

-

PROJECT TEAM
HERITAGE

(Oct. 22, 1980) [hereinafter cited as

Taylor, Federal Program of Legal Aid for Poor Faces Conservative
Challenge, N.Y. Times, Nov. 25, 1980, § B, at 13, col. 3.
4. Although the transition team's report has not been made public, summaries have appeared in the press. See 17 ABA Wash. Letter (Feb. 1, 1981);
Freivogel, Reagan's Advisors Urge Curbs on Legal Services Corp., St. Louis
Post-Dispatch, Jan. 18, 1981, §A, at 11, col. 2.
5. See HERITAGE FOUNDATION, supra note 3, at 2.
6. See id. at 2-10.
7. See Taylor, Legal Aid for the Poor Did Work, and That's the Rub,
N.Y. Times, Mar. 15, 1981, col. I.
8. A. FRANCE, LE Lys ROUGE C. 7 (1894), quoted in BARTLETr's FAMILIAR
QUOTATIONS 655 (E. Beck ed., 1980). The irony that France had in mind was
that an apparently neutral prohibition was not really neutral if it prohibited
behavior that only one economic class was inclined to engage in. The American
court system operates on a converse irony: it permits both rich and poor to
purchase access to official resolution of disputes, but the facial neutrality breaks
down when the price of access is not nominal.
FOUNDATION];
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The legal profession recognized an ethical obligation to provide representation for indigents, and many lawyers devoted substantial portions of their time to unpaid practice, especially on behalf of criminal defendants. Substantial changes did not come about
until the Supreme Court, beginning with Gideon v. Wainwright 9
in 1963, recognized a constitutional right to appointed counsel in
criminal cases. 1 Subsequent decisions have expanded this right
to misdemeanor cases and to a very limited category of civil proceedings."' The indigent criminal defendant is now provided a defense lawyer at public expense, either through a public defender
or assigned-counsel system.
Except in a few special instances, however, there was and is
2 As a
no constitutional right to appointed counsel in civil cases.'
practical matter, however, the contingent-fee system provided representation in cases involving personal injuries and job-related
injuries. The enactment of attorney's fees provisions has provided
some inducement for private attorneys to assist in the vindication of
certain statutory rights such as the prohibition of employment discrimination. But most legal problems of the poor have been left
unattended because the responsibility for providing assistance was
a collective responsibility of the entire bar.'8 Like many shared
responsibilities, no one felt individually responsible and the need
went unmet.
Four eras in civil legal aid in the United States may be identified. Prior to 1875, legal aid was left to the unorganized and voluntary activities of individual lawyers. Although occasional representation was provided, the pro bono efforts of American lawyers were
directed largely to the defense of indigents charged with crime, in
itself no small task.
The rise of voluntary organizations - a typically American response to a tough social problem - characterizes the second era.
9. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
10. Id. at 344-45.
11. See, e.g., Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (misdemeanor
cases); In re Ella B., 30 N.Y.2d 352, 285 N.E.2d 687, 334 N.Y.S.2d 337 (1972)
(child neglect proceedings); In re Fisher, 39 Ohio St. 2d 71, 313 N.E.2d 861
(1974) (civil commitment proceedings).
12. See, e.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (filing fee for
divorce cases held to violate due process); Payne v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. 3d
908, 553 P.2d 656, 132 Cal. Rptr. 405 (1976) (indigent prisoner also defendant
in civil action entitled to appointed counsel); In re Smiley, 36 N.Y.2d 433, 330
N.E.2d 53, 369 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1975) (no right to appointed counsel for indigents
in divorce actions). See generally Cramton, Promise and Reality in Legal
Services, 61 CORNELL L. REv. 670, 674-80 (1976).
13. See generally R. SMITH, JUSTICE AND THE POOR 6-12 (1919).
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The year 1875 marked the beginning of traditional legal aid
through private organizations financed by charitable contributions,
staffed by a small number of full-time lawyers, and assisted by the
volunteered time of lawyers in private practice. 14 Through the
efforts of such pioneers as Reginald Heber Smith, and with the
support of the organized bar, legal aid offices were established in
most large metropolitan areas by 1962.15
Traditional legal aid was oriented toward individual client
service, helping individuals with legal problems, such as landlordtenant controversies, family quarrels, and consumer affairs. The
implicit assumption was that justice was a civil right, not a commodity to be purchased.' 6
A more controversial approach to legal aid characterized the
third era, which began in 1965 with the legal services program of
the now defunct Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO).17 The
Gideon case had recognized a constitutional right to appointed
counsel in criminal cases; a period of destructive urban riots had
suggested the desirability of providing more peaceful methods of
handling the grievances of the urban poor; and President Johnson, with large congressional support, had embarked on his War on
Poverty.
The OEO legal services program did not reject the clientservice objective of traditional legal aid, but it included an emphasis on two additional objectives: 1) social justice through law
reform and income redistribution; "I and 2) political organization
of the poor.19 It was assumed that legal rules and procedures
would have a class bias against the poor. These rules could be
reformed by impact litigation which would equalize the treatment
of the poor and provide them with a larger share of the social pie.
Similarly, the powerlessness of the poor - their lack of clout with
elected officials - was attributed to their lack of organization. One
14. See E. BROWNELL,

LEGAL AID IN THE UNITED STATES

166 (1951).

15. In 1947, when Emery Brownell surveyed legal aid for the ABA, there
were 70 independent legal aid organizations; by 1963, that number had increased
to 249. See J. HANDLER, J. HOLLINGSWORTH, & R. GINSBURG, ORGANIZATIONS
AND LEGAL RIGHTS ACTIVITIES 2-5 (1974) [hereinafter cited as HANDLER].
16. For discussion of the objectives and limitations of traditional legal aid,
see E. JOHNSON, JUSTICE AND REFORM: THE FORMATIVE YEARS OF THE OEO
LEGAL SERVICES PROGRAM

(1974).

See also

HANDLER,

supra note 15, at 737 n.15.

17. See E. JOHNSON, supra note 16, at 176-82, 196-221.
18. Id. at 222-24. See also Brill, The Uses and Abuses of Legal Assistance,
33 THE PUB. INTEREST 38 (1973).
19. See Finman, OEO Legal Services Programs and the Pursuit of Social
Change: The Relationship Between Program Ideology and Program Performance, 1971 WIs. L. REv. 1001, 1001-06.
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major purpose of OEO legal services was to assist groups of poor
people in organizing as groups. The formation of voting blocs
would exert pressure on governmental institutions; poor people
would acquire self-confidence and self-direction by participation
in the power struggles of a pluralist society; and they would benefit from more favorable decisions by legislatures, administrative
bodies, and the courts.
It is not surprising that a taxpayer-funded program with these
objectives quickly became highly controversial. Many "poverty
lawyers" funded by grants from OEO were viewed as left-wing
agitators, engaged in a political agenda of their own and having little
interest in the humdrum legal problems of the poor, with which
traditional legal aid was almost exclusively concerned.
Political interference with the program began during the
Johnson years and during the early '70's the program was fighting
for its life. At one point President Nixon decided to dismantle
the program and Howard Phillips, a young political lieutenant,
was dispatched to the OEO to carry out the task.20 A series of
bruising battles in Congress and the courts left the program in
place but crippled in morale and funding. The American Bar
Association, which had committed itself to publicly-funded legal
assistance a few years earlier under the leadership of Lewis F.
Powell, Jr., now Justice Powell, fought hard for the establishment
of a permanent legal services program in a form that would remove
it from the immediate supervision of the President and vicissitudes
of politics. 21 When President Nixon shifted ground and supported
this approach, the Legal Services Corporation Act was signed into
law,22 beginning the fourth era in civil legal aid. It was the last
major piece of legislation signed by Nixon before his resignation
in the summer of 1974.
The early days of the Legal Services Corporation were exciting
ones. 23 Since I had the honor of being appointed by President
Ford, with Senate confirmation, as the initial chairman of the
Board of Directors of the Corporation, I was, as Dean Acheson has
20. For a good discussion of the legal and political controversies surrounding the OEO legal services program, see George, Development of the Legal
Services Corporation, 61 CORNELL L. Riv. 681 (1976). See also B. GARTH,
NEIGHBORHOOD LAW FIRMS FOR THE POOR 25-42 (1980).
21. See George, supra note 20, at 682-99,.
22. Legal Services Corporation Act, Pub. L. No. 93-355, 88 Stat. 378 (1974)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2996 (1976 & Supp. 1979)). See generally George, supra

note 20, at 695-98.
23. For an account of these early days, see Arnold, And Finally, 342 Days
Later .. . , 5 JURIs DocTOR 32 (1975).
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put it in another context, "present at the creation." 24 The Corporation started with no offices, a severe labor dispute with the
small and demoralized staff inherited from OEO, and field programs
that were starved for funds, low in morale, and suspicious of the
new Corporation. We didn't even have a photocopy machine.
I recall typing and copying our initial budget submission to Congress in the wee hours of the night in the borrowed offices of a
government agency in Washington, assisted by a small band of
volunteers from the legal services community. By 3 a.m., a few
short hours before the hearing on the appropriation request was
to begin, we had produced the necessary sixty copies.
Those were memorable days; but my story today will not
dwell further upon them, since broader questions and current
travails deserve your attention.
The Legal Services Corporation Act (Act) contained two features that were designed to cure most of the deficiencies of its OEO
predecessor. The first was independence, both from political control by politicians and from political use by legal service attorneys;
and the second was a strong focus on professionalism - delivering
quality legal services in accordance with the best traditions of the
profession. 25 The creation of a new quasi-governmental body governed by an independent and non-partisan board of directors was
designed to insulate legal service programs from the kind of poitical intervention that had troubled the OEO program.2 6 Statutory prohibitions prevented legal service grantees from using program funds or personnel for political purposes, organizational
27
activities, or participation in strikes, picketing, and demonstrations.
24. D. ACHESON, PRESENT AT THE CREATION (1969). The phrase was taken
from a statement attributed to Alfonso X, the Learned King of Spain, from
1252-84: "Had I been present at the creation I would have given some useful
hints for the better ordering of the universe." See id. at frontispiece.
25. Cramton, The Task Ahead in Legal Services, 61 A.B.A.J. 1339 (1975);
George, supra note 20, at 700-09.
26. See George, supra note 20, at 682-90.

The efforts of Mayor Daley in

the Johnson administration and Governor Reagan in the Nixon administration

to affect the activities of grantees provide apt illustrations of political inter.
vention in the operations of the OEO program. See B. GARTH, supra note 20,

at 43.
27. See 42 U.S.C. § 2996a (7) (Supp. 1979) (forbidding legal assistance
attorneys from participating in political activities such as voter registration and
transportation); id. § 2996(b)(5) (forbidding employees of recipients providing
legal assistance from taking part in or encouraging public demonstrations,
attorneys from
id. § 2996f(a)(b)
or strikes);
boycotts,political
picketing,
specified off-duty
activities).
See also (forbidding
45 C.F.R. §§staff
1608,
1612 (1980)
(implementing regulations). The constitutional issues raised by these and other
restrictions are discussed in Note, Depoliticizing Legal Aid: A Constitutional
Analysis of the Legal Services CorporationAct, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 734 (1976).
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On the major issue of the nature and scope of representation
to be provided to poor clients, the Act smothered quite different
perspectives and objectives under a soothing new slogan: access to
justice for all. This neutral principle clearly encompassed the individual-client service of traditional legal aid. It also included the
law reform objective of the OEO program so long as the significant
issues to be litigated arose out of client service in actual cases.
The governing principle was that a lawyer for the poor should
do the best he can for his client, just as the lawyer for Exxon or
anyone else does. If the zealous and complete representation required by the Code of Professional Responsibility 28 leads the lawyer
to believe that framing a test case, pursuing extensive discovery, or
participating in administrative or legislative proceedings will best
advance the interests of the client, then these activities should be
undertaken. 29 The explicit statutory proviso was that the legal
services attorney cannot dream up the law suit and then solicit the
client; the law suit must emerge out of routine client service. 30 Nor
could the legal services attorney organize a client group so that he
could litigate its rights.0 1 But education of poor clients concerning
28. See Carrington, The Right to Zealous Counsel, 1979 DUKE L.J.

1291.

29. Congress, in defining the purposes of the Legal Services Corporation,
declared that "attorneys providing legal assistance must have full freedom to
protect the best interests of their clients in keeping with the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Canons of Ethics, and the high standards of the legal
profession." 42 U.S.C. § 2996(6) (1977). See also id. § 2996e(b)(3) (Corporation
must not interfere with any attorney carrying out his professional responsibilities).
30. The history of the "national back-up centers" created during the OEO
years provides the clearest illustration of this principle. These centers originally
developed in the mid-1960's and were designed to cure caseload and staffing
problems of local legal services projects by providing a national system of
specialized legal services which concentrated on cases involving issues affecting
the entire class of the poor and by providing expertise in poverty law that
local service projects lacked. George, supra note 20, at 709-22. After much
success, these centers were attacked by conservative politicians as an "intellectual
brain trust which prepackages the lawsuits which go across the country." 119
CONG. REC. 20,721 (1973) (remarks of Representative Conlan). The result was
restrictive language in the Legal Services Corporation Act prohibiting the farming out of research, training, and technical assistance by the Corporation. See
42 U.S.C. § 2996e(a)(3) (Supp. 1979). Restructured as "support centers", they
now provide specialized litigation and lobbying services on behalf of particular
clients and client groups in such areas as education, health, housing, and
welfare. See George, supra, at 709-22.
31. The regulations of the Legal Services Corporation first prohibit staff
attorneys from participating in demonstrations, strikes, boycotts, and other
such activities, but then except "informing and advising a client about legal
alternatives to litigation . . . and [a]ttending a public demonstration . . . for

the purpose of providing legal assistance to a client .... ." 45 C.F.R. §§ 1612.2,
1612.3 (1980). Similarly, legislative and administrative representation may be
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their legal rights, including their right to organize, was not precluded.8 2 These competing principles obviously require making a
number of fine distinctions.
Hence the present framework for legal services authorizes the
full armory of legal techniques and procedures to be brought to
bear on behalf of poor clients, as required in the particular case.
Impact litigation and lobbying activities are included insofar as
they arise out of client representation.3 3 But the more frankly
political objectives of the OEO program - to organize the poor or
constituent segments as effective pressure groups - are excluded by
statute.3 4 The Act substitutes more neutral rhetoric of "access to
justice" for the more emotionally charged "law reform" and "social
5
change" rhetoric of the OEO program.
III. DESCRIPTION OF THE CURRENT PROGRAM

Until the crisis precipitated by President Reagan's recent decision to eliminate the program, legal services prospered under the
new structural arrangement. In 1975, when the Corporation came
into being, the legal services program was clustered in major cities
of the North and Far West; and the programs in these areas were
starved and demoralized from five years of static funding and conprovided "on behalf of an eligible client . . . if the client may be affected by
a particular legislative or administrative measure but no employee shall solicit
a client in violation of professional responsibilities for the purpose of making
such representation possible.
... Id. § 1612.4.
32. Id. § 1612.3.
33. See id. § 1612.4(a)(2) ("An employee may engage in such activities
[legislative and administrative lobbying and representation] on behalf of an
eligible client . . . if the client may be affected by a particular legislative or
administrative measure ..
").
34. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2996e(d)(1)(4) (no use of corporation funds to advocate
or oppose ballot measures, initiatives, or referenda); 2996f(a)(s)(A) (no use of
corporation funds to influence executive orders, administrative regulations, or
legislation unless necessary to representation of client); 2996f(b)(6) (no use of
corporation funds to provide training programs to advocate or encourage
public policies or political activities) (Supp. 1979). See also 56 C.F.R.
§ 1612.4(a)(2) (1980) ("no employee shall solicit a client in violation of professional responsibilities for the purpose of making such representation
(administrative or legislative] possible ..
").
35. 42 U.S.C. §§2996b, 2996e (Supp. III 1979). See Bellow, Turning
Solutions into Problems: The Legal Aid Experience, 34 NLADA BRIEFCASE
106, 107-08 (1977). Bellow describes the approach of the Legal Services Corporation as that of more of the same. Id. at 107. He describes the current
technique of the Corporation as one to "expand existing programs, establish
new ones in areas where services have not previously been available, dampen
any excessively political rhetoric which might evoke images of the more controversial sixties, and eventually establish a 'national delivery system' of legal
help to the poor." Id. at 107-08.
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stant attack.3 6 In five short years, legal services has become a
national program providing a minimum level of service to poor
people in all parts of the country8 7 Funding grew rapidly from
$70 million in 1975 to $321 million in 1981.38
The structure of the program is worth a brief explanation.
The Corporation is not empowered to provide legal services to
anyone. 39 It is a grant-making and regulatory organization that
funds and supervises community-based organizations which hire
attorneys to represent eligible poor persons. 40 The Corporation is
governed by an eleven-member board of directors which selects a
president, who in turn supervises an administrative staff. 4' The
Corporation issues regulations governing the program (for example,
defining the group eligible for service pursuant to general statutory
guidelines),42 makes grants to the local program for the delivery of
legal services, audits the activities of these programs, and carries on
general support activities such as training and research that assist
43
the program as a whole.
Representation of poor clients is carried on by 323 local programs funded by the Corporation. 44 They include a few specialized
litigation organizations (referred to as support centers and having a
national scope), a small number of specialized client programs for
native Americans and migrants, and a large number of communitybased programs scattered throughout the country, each serving a
particular geographic area. Each local program is a separate nonprofit corporation, with its own board of directors and staff. Statutory provisions and Corporation regulations govern the composition
45
and functions of the governing boards.
The 323 independent programs funded by the Corporation are
staffed by about 6,200 attorneys, 2,800 paralegals, and a large num36. See Cramton, supra note 25, at 1339-41.
37. LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION, ANNUAL

REPORT 7-8

(1979) [hereinafter

cited as ANNUAL REPORT].
38. Id.

39. See 42 U.S.C. § 2996e(a) (1976) (outlining the powers, duties and limitations of the Corporation); id. § 2996f (outlining the requisites and limitations
on recipient organizations and clients in making grants and contracts).

40. See id. §§ 2996b, 2996e.
41. Id. § 2996c (dealing with the board of directors); id. § 2996d (dealing
with the appointment and powers of the president).
42. See 45 C.F.R. § 1611 (1980).
43. See ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 37, at 21-27 (describing the work of
the Corporation).
44. Id. at 30-35 (listing the 323 independent programs funded in 1979).
45. 42 U.S.C. § 2996f(c) (1976); 45 C.F.R. § 1607 (1980).
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ber of secretaries and clerks. 4" They handle more than 1,000,000
poor clients a year through about 1,200 local offices. 47 Although
the independent programs receive support from other sources, over
two-thirds of the total funding comes from the Corporation. Other
federal funding sources provide about 22/, with private contributions and state and local government contributing the remaining

110/.48

The staff lawyers employed by the local programs are generally
relatively young and low paid; entering salaries average about
$14,000 per year and average salaries for all lawyers are less than
$17,000; both figures are well below compensation provided by
private law firms or other government offices. 49 Case loads are large,
ranging up to 150-250 open cases per attorney.50 The new attorneys
are generally liberal and idealistic, and there is a high turnover.
About one-fourth of new attorneys leave the program in a year or
less; more than 80% are gone after three years. 51 Those who survive more than three years are likely to make a career of legal
services; they become the leaders and supervisors of the more inexperienced attorneys who join the program, work with a burst of
enthusiasm for a year or two, and leave "burned out" by the constant pressure of handling a large volume of generally routine cases.
An American Bar Foundation study of the legal needs of the
public suggests that nearly one-fourth of poor people have a civil
legal problem each year deserving of a lawyer's attention."2 Under
current eligibility standards, which permit an annual income no
larger than $4,738 for a single person and $9,313 for a family of
four, 53 about 29 million Americans fall within the pool of eligible
clients. 54 Obviously, only a small fraction of them receive service
each year. Although no precise information is available, it is estimated that the current program handles about one-eighth of the
legal needs of eligible poor persons. An enormous but unlikely
46. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 37, at 8. See also LEGAL SERVICES CORP.,
CHARACTERISTICS OF FIELD PROGRAMS SUPPORTED BY THE LEGAL SERVICES CORP. 7
(Feb. 1981) [hereinafter cited as CHARACTERISTICS].
47.

ANNUAL REPORT,

48. CHARACTERISTICS,

supra note 37, at 8.
supra note 46, at 18.

49. Id.
50. See Bellow, supra note 32, at 117.
51. CHARACTERISTICS, supra note 46, at 18.
52. B. CURRAN, THE LEGAL NEEDS OF THE PUBLIC C. 4 (American Bar
Foundation 1977).
53. 45 C.F.R. § 1611 (app. 1980). Somewhat higher amounts apply to
Alaska and Hawaii. Id.
54. Cramton, supra note 12, at 672-73.
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expansion in the program would be required to meet the needs
of all.
Last year the legal services program handled about one and
one-half million matters for over a million poor persons. 5 The
average cost of each matter handled is about $200. The program's
clients are 51% white, 30% black, and 10% hispanic. Only onefifth of them are employed; most are living on welfare or Social
Security.
The types of cases fall into expected categories. Thirty-four
percent involve family matters; 17% involve landlord-tenant or
other housing problems; 14% are concerned with income maintenance; and 12% involve consumer disputes. The rest involve an
enormous variety of subjects.5 6
IV. CRITICISMS OF THE LEGAL SERVICES PROGRAM

Criticisms of the current legal services program fall into three
categories: 1) the program is a political instrument of activist
lawyers; 2) it is not a poor people's program but a lawyers' program; and 3) it is inefficient both in assisting poor people and in
the costs it places on others. Each of these charges deserves
examination.
A. Political Activism
The most common criticism of the legal services program is
that it embodies or encourages activism by staff attorneys who seek
to stir up litigation to force judicial resolution of matters that
should be left to elected officials. 57 Even the statement of the
criticism raises fundamental questions not limited to legal aid, concerning the appropriate role of courts, legislatures, and the executive in a democratic society, to say nothing of the difficulty of
characterizing particular issues as "political" or "activist." The
55. Data on the matters dealt with in this paragraph are contained in
annual reports of the Legal Services Corporation.
note 37, at 14-20.

See

ANNUAL REPORT,

supra

56. Id. at 15.
57. See Ostroff, Legal Aid is Target of Conservatives Who See It As
Subsidized Liberalism, Kansas City Times, .Jan. 26, 1981, § A, at I, col. 1.
See also Schlafly, Lawyers for Poor Loaded with Fat, St. Louis Globe-Democrat,
Mar. 13, 1981, col. 1. Ms. Schlafly argues that the "Legal Services Corp. ...
has turned into a monster which is fomenting radical and revolutionary programs at the taxpayers' expense. . . . Many activists financed by the Legal
Services Corp. are committed to the goal of implementing a radical social and
political agenda." Id.
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legal services program is attacked because it tempts judges to venture into areas in which critics believe they should not enter.
Howard Phillips, who led the Nixon administration's unsuccessful attempt to dismantle the OEO legal program in 1973, and
who now heads the National Defeat Legal Services Committee of
the Conservative Caucus says:
[I]t is a violation of the constitutional rights of every
American to be required to subsidize activities which are
essentially political in nature but are not accountable to
the market place or the ballot box. .

.

.

Legal services

attorneys have been involved in virtually every liberal
cause .

. .

. And through the Legal Services Corp., Con-

gress has subsidized the liberal faith.5 8

If the facts were as implied by Mr. Phillips, most people would
agree that taxpayers' funds should not be devoted to essentially
political activities. But no factual support for these charges is supplied. Further, the examples given by Mr. Phillips and others are
not convincing. In one recent statement, he cited representation
of Iranian student protestors, suits promoting affirmative action in
employment and education, and claims of American Indians for
tribal lands as typical activities of the program. 59 Although it is
arguable that neither college students nor aliens should be represented by the federal legal services, it is not apparent to me why
deportation proceedings, the enforcement of nondiscrimination in
employment and education, and Indian land claims are not appropriate areas in which the rights of poor people should be enforced.
The well-to-do utilize members of the private bar to litigate educational discrimination,6" deportation, and entitlement to federal land.
Those claiming interests in federal lands or in their use frequently
litigate those claims against the federal government. Why is it
"political activism" when poor people enforce their rights in these
areas and not when other private interests do so?
All assertions of rights on behalf of a particular class of persons
are "political" in the sense that they involve the social distribution
of benefits and status. Rights that are recent creations of legislatures or administrators, such as rights relating to affirmative action
in employment, are especially likely to be viewed as controversial
58. Ostroff, supra note 57, at 1, 4.

59. Freivogel, Legal Aid For Poor Faces Fight, St. Louis Post-Dispatch,
Jan. 4, 1981.

60. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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in character and hence as "political." In the labor field, for example, statutory provisions relating to union organization were
much more bitterly contested, and hence controversial, in the 1930's
than they are today. The passage of time may similarly mute some
areas of current controversy. But it is not the enforcement of
statutory rights in the courts that is "political," since access to the
courts is a neutral principle applicable to all rights. The "political"
label attaches to the fact that some people, despite the legislative or
judicial creation of rights, continue to view them as controversial.
The "political activism" critique, insofar as it does not overlap
with more general concern about judicial activism, appears to involve two subthemes: the propriety of the government funding law
suits against itself, and the relative emphasis in the legal services
program of impact litigation as against individual client service.
Should the federal legal services program permit representation
involving suits against governmental units or before legislative
bodies, including administrative rulemaking? It is apparent that
the program as we now know it would be crippled if these forms
of representation were to be prohibited. Poor people would have
effective recourse against merchants, landlords, and other private
persons, but not against governmental agencies or officers.
In an area in which there is large and reasonable concern
about the scope of governmental activity and the heavy hand of
bureaucrats on private activity, it is surprising to hear voices from
the right arguing that poor people should not be able to obtain
representation to challenge the validity of governmental action
which affects them. One would suppose that policing the bureaucracy on behalf of private individuals would appeal to conservatives.
Legal services lawyers sue governmental bodies to vindicate
the legal rights of the poor. While it rankles some politicians to
use government funds this way, there is every reason to make a
large, bureaucratic, and fallible government accountable in its own
courts. The legitimacy of the claims asserted, of course, is determined by the independent judiciary, not by the indigent clients or
their lawyers. The counter argument appears to rest solely on a
concern that such suits increase the cost of government because of
the expense of defense and the fact that litigation sometimes requires increased expenditures such as payment of welfare benefits
wrongly withheld. But such representation of the poor often reduces the work load of government agencies by putting the claims
of poor people into a comprehensible form so that they may be
handled easily and cheaply. Even if the increased costs more than
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offset the savings, the enhanced legitimacy of the government resulting from its compliance with the rule of law is itself of incalculable value.
The second subtheme concerns the relative emphasis of the
legal services program on impact litigation rather than individual
client service. The critics of the legal services program talk as if
the only cases that a program should handle are those that are
routine and unimportant, affecting the individual client and no
one else. The normal rules of stare decisis and res judicata make
that an impossible goal since a judicial precedent affects all persons
similarly situated and res judicata may bind the same defendant
when sued by other plaintiffs, now that issue preclusion has moved
away from the former requirement of mutuality of estoppel. 61
Moreover, whether the result in a law suit will turn out to be
significant cannot be determined at its commencement. The importance of a decision results from the particular findings of fact
and rulings of law that a court makes at the conclusion of a case.
Many lawyers have been disappointed when their "landmark" cases
were ultimately decided on trivial points, and major rulings have
often emerged from routine cases. Nor can it be assumed that
significant cases will all be decided in favor of the indigent client,
since major cases can be lost as well as won.
It is true that the legal services movement has a shared ideology
in which "law reform litigation"is highly valued.6 2 Abandonment
of any opportunity to engage in significant litigation or legislative
activity would make the program uninteresting to many of the better
lawyers who now find it a fulfilling career. Inability to raise and
win significant victories for poor people - however "significance" is
determined - would also make a mockery of our claim of equal justice under law. The lawyer for the poor client would be restricted
to repetitive and insignificant problems, and presumably would have
to abandon his client's interests, in violation of professional ethics,
when an issue of importance to others emerged.
Aside from these practical and philosophical difficulties with
the concern about law reform, there is an efficiency concern.
Repetitive litigation of the same problem in one-by-one litigation
is wasteful of private and public resources. The disposition of significant issues in a manner that affects a large number of people
61. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979) (authorizing
offensive use of issue preclusion in the federal courts).
62. See e.g., E. JOHNSON, supra note 16, at 278-84; Bellow, supra note 35.
at 106.
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provides a much more efficient use of taxpayer funds for legal
services. Any other approach would be wasteful and duplicative,
.even if feasible.
The concern about impact litigation also rests on an inaccurate
perception of the underlying facts. The critics of legal services
have been mesmerized by the publicity given to a small number of
highly visible controversies and by the ambitious rhetoric of an
occasional legal services lawyer, who may talk enthusiastically and
unrealistically about changing the world through test cases or class
actions. The reality of day-by-day work in a legal services office,
6
however, is far different.
An examination of the caseload of the legal services program as
a whole indicates that the vast bulk of the cases and attorney effort
is directed to individual client service. As Howard Eisenberg,
executive director of the NLADA, has stated: "There's a good deal
of misinformation about what legal aid lawyers do. Basically, they
spend most of their time providing bread and butter and nuts and
bolts legal services for the poor." 64 In recent years only two-tenths
of one percent of all completed cases nationwide have been categorized by the independent programs that handled them as "significant", having importance beyond the individual client.6 5 Since
more than a million cases are handled each year, only about 2,000
cases nationwide are thus viewed as significant by the lawyers who
handled them. Moreover, this number probably overstates the
number of cases of widespread importance. Because law reform
litigation has a high status among legal service attorneys, there is
.a strong tendency among them to exaggerate rather than denigrate
the significance of a program's cases.
Evaluations of individual programs and of the national effort
almost invariably conclude that most programs are devoting a disproportionate amount of their time to routine matters and that
federal dollars would be more effective if a larger portion were devoted to significant matters. 6 Data concerning the frequency of
63. See Bellow, supra note 35, at 108-09 (stating that the recurrent features
of legal services programs are routine processing of cases, low client autonomy,
narrow definitions of client concerns, and inadequate outcomes).
64. Goldenberg, Legal Aid for the Poor Is Facing Rough Future, Memphis
Press-Scrimitar, Feb. 12, 1981, at 107.
65. Houseman, Class Actions and Legal Services 11 (1980) (unpublished
memorandum for the Legal Services Corporation). Mere numbers, of course,
do not reveal the proportion of effort devoted to "significant" cases or class
.actions. But the numbers are so small that they carry some implications for
proportion of effort as well.
66. See Bellow, supra note 35, at 121-22.
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class actions point in the same direction. A survey of a random
sample of legal services attorneys in 1978 revealed that only 29%
of them had participated in at least one class action during the
immediately prior period of more than three years. 67 These figures
suggest that, whatever the occasional rhetoric may be at national
meetings at which legal services attorneys exchange views, the individual programs find it impossible to resist the enormous pressure
of the hurt, troubled people who fill their waiting rooms and request, with the most obvious need, routine legal services.
As Colman McCarthy has said:
The image of poverty lawyers coming into an area to
rabble-rouse or shake up the local powers, as Mayor Daley
of Chicago viewed the program in the mid-60's, was always
false. .

.

.

[T]he 5,000 lawyers in the 335 programs

around the country [know] that the daily work is an unglamorous mix of merely winning for the poor a few of
their rightful crumbs or keeping them from being
snatched away.
Some days, it is sorting out food stamp problems.
Other times, it is taking action to keep a mother on welfare or settling a landlord-tenant dispute. With about
120 open cases to deal with - 60 would be a heavy load [a legal services attorney] is kept busy. 68
In short, the charges of political activism are lacking both in
logic and factual support. Legal services lawyers are not ideological
ambulance chasers but reasonably ambitious and idealistic attorneys
who are trying to do good legal work under trying circumstances.
The sheer pressure of numbers and the desire to provide minimum
service to as many as possible are dominant characteristics of the
existing system.
B. A Lawyers' Program,Not a Poor Peoples' Program
A more fundamental but less common critique of the legal
services program is that, despite its noble pretense, its benefits go
largely to lawyers instead of poor people. The argument has been
most fully stated by Stephen Chapman. 69 Mr. Chapman raises
67. See Houseman, supra note 65, at 11.
68. McCarthy, With Justice For All Who Can Afford It, Wash. Post,
May 11, 1980, § K, at 10, col. 1.

69. See Chapman, The Rich Get Rich, and the Poor Get Lawyers, The
New Republic, Sept. 24, 1977, at 9, reprinted in 126 CONG. REc. 6863 (1980)
(remarks of Sen. Helms).
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provocative questions concerning the purposes and effects of the

legal services program.
Who benefits from the program?, asks Mr. Chapman. He
answers that its principal benefits run to its lawyer supporters and
proponents, not to the poor people who are its ostensible beneficiaries. The legal services program, according to Mr. Chapman,
is a full employment bill for lawyers.7 0 The ABA and other bar
associations support the program because it provides employment
for the current overflow of young lawyers from the law schools,
who would otherwise be in competition with the existing private
bar. Since legal services programs are prohibited from taking feegenerating cases, they do not compete with private lawyers. Even
more important, every case handled by a legal services lawyer creates
new business for other lawyers, since the opposing parties need the
services of a lawyer. Thus the program has a tremendous multiplier effect; it not only relieves the competitive pressures of new
lawyers entering the legal market, but also requires additional
compensated lawyer time to defend the claims brought by legal
services lawyers.
There is an old adage that provides jocular support for this
view. In a small town in Vermont one lawyer was struggling along,
barely eking out a living. Another lawyer moved to town and now
both are doing nicely. The point is obvious: the presence of
lawyers increases the demand for their services.
The second wing of Mr. Chapman's argument characterizes the
program as paternalistic and doubts the importance of the public
provision of legal services in contrast to other possible benefits for
the poor, especially money. Mr. Chapman argues that lawyers
exaggerate the importance of legal counsel, regarding it, "like food,
shelter, and medical care, as a basic right, the lack of which makes

life practically intolerable." 7 1 Lawyers, like every other group,
tend to "magnify the importance of what they do." 72 This is
especially so when public provision of legal services serves lawyers'
self interest and relieves them of the duty to provide pro bono
services to those who can't afford to pay.
Mr. Chapman notes:
The legal services program may be the most extreme
example of the paternalism of the American welfare state:
70. Id. at 10. Chapman argues that: "LSC-funded programs offer jobs
that otherwise wouldn't exist, making the program something of a Humphrey
Hawkins bill of the legal community." Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
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denying the poor what they explicitly lack - money - in

favor of the goods and services the government thinks they
should have, in the amount and proportion it deems appropriate. There is much validity in the libertarian argument that this approach denies the poor both the freedom
to decide their own needs and the responsibility, essential
to individual independence and self-reliance, to accept the
73
consequences of such decisions.
If a negative income tax or other program redistributed income to the poor, some of them might purchase legal services with
the money. Chapman guesses that most poor people would not
value legal services very highly since food, shelter, clothing, education, or even entertainment are likely to have a higher value
to them.
Moreover, Mr. Chapman argues, the subsidized availability of
lawyers to the poor
. . . turn[s] another ordinary piece of social friction into a
legal dispute . . . inevitably [reducing] the areas of social

life where people are free to interact without the formalities of legal procedures, and without the assistance of
lawyers.

.

.

.

Few trends are more depressing than the

increasingly litigious character of American society and
government. Our growing inclination to handle every
dispute through our lawyers brings to mind Judge Learned
Hand's remark that he feared only death and illness as
much as a lawsuit . . . "Thickening layers of legalism
seem to surround our lives." . . . [T]he blame for too

much law can be laid on too many lawyers and their
dogmatic reliance on the adversary process as a solution to
all social problems.7 4
Lawyers need to struggle with these arguments. The tendency
of every group to identify its interest with that of society is almost
universal. Lawyers as a class do benefit in many ways, psychic as
well as economic, from the legal services program. And the trends
toward litigious formalism and social fragmentation are painfully
evident.
The issues presented by these arguments are very broad, far
beyond the scope of this discussion, but a brief response is required.
First, the opportunity to enforce legal rights and responsibilities
involves more than just economics and efficiency. It is a question
73. Id. at 14.
74. Id.
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of the moral tone of a society and the legitimacy of its institutions.
Although we must be self-critical of our tendency as lawyers to
prefer the virtues of law over other things, many laymen share our
view of the priority of the rule of law.
Second, the economic arguments in favor of distribution of
money rather than legal services assume that substantial amounts
of money would be available for distribution and that market imperfections do not prevent rational choices by poor people. Both
assumptions are dubious. The current appropriation for the
national legal services program amounts to only about ten dollars

per eligible poor person.7 5 That amount of money will not purchase much in the way of legal services or anything else. And poor
people, precisely because they are often uneducated and uninformed,
may lack reliable information concerning their need for legal
services and how to get them, as well as the ability to pay for them.76
In using money made available by the state, they may not be able
to make informed choices.
Finally, especially in situations in which poor people are affected, but each with respect to a small amount, there is a free-rider
problem.7 No one has an incentive to expend the amount necessary to litigate a $100 claim, but the pooling effect of legal services
operates to confer a benefit on all members of the group by supporting litigation based on the aggregated value of the claims, which
may be very large.
C. Economic Efficiency
Arguments that the legal services program is paternalistic and
lawyer-oriented are closely related to attacks on the program on
grounds of economic efficiency. Professor Posner, for example,
states some of the same points made by Chapman in language more
75. About 29 million Americans fall within the eligible-client population;
since the expenditures for the program were $300 million in 1980, the amount
expended per eligible person was about ten dollars. See notes 52-55 and

accompanying text supra.
76. I am uncomfortable with the paternalism implicit in this argument.
Moreover, even if there is a lack of information concerning legal needs and
substantial options among poor people, a less intrusive approach for govern.
ment would be to provide relevant information rather than the service itself.
77. "Free riders" are those who receive the benefits of successful litigation
although they bear none of the costs. For discussion of the "free ride" problem
in the administrative law field, see Cramton, The Why, Where, and How of
Broadened Public Participation in the Administrative Process, 60 GEo. L.J.
525 (1972). For discussion of the alternative of aggregating numerous small
claims through class action proceedings, see R.
LAW

POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF

449-50 (2d ed. 1977).
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familiar to economists.7 8 Providing legal services to the poor at no
price, he argues, "prevents many poor people from achieving their
most efficient pattern of consumption." 79 A poor person will accept free legal services unless their value to him is outweighed by
the lost time and other inconvenience of dealing with a lawyer.
The demand for free legal services will invariably exceed the available supply, creating a serious rationing problem. 0 Since the value
to some recipients will be less than its cost to the taxpayers, the
distribution of free services is wasteful. It is better, in his view, to
give poor persons $100 and let them decide how to spend it.8'
Posner also argues that free legal services misallocate resources
in other respects. Since legal services are usually employed in a
dispute with another, the adverse party must increase its legal expenditures or abandon its stake in the dispute. These costs, if a
market for services and products is involved, will inevitably be
passed on as costs of production. Thus, for example, enforcement
of building codes against landlords will result in a substantial reduction in the supply of low-income housing, and a substantial rise
2
in the price of the remaining supply.
Litigation against governmental agencies has somewhat different effects, Posner argues, since the costs are borne by taxpayers
rather than by those purchasing the product or service. In some
situations such litigation may redistribute income to the poor who
are beneficiaries of the social program under consideration, while
in others it may merely redistribute the program's benefits among
groups of beneficiaries.8 3 In any event, if litigation results in increased taxes, legislative efforts may be made to reduce future
eligibility or benefits.
The provision of free legal services also creates opportunities
for abuse when particular opponents are singled out for extensive
and repetitive litigation. s4 The typical litigant's hunger for justice
78. See R. POSNER, supra note 77, at 355-59.
79. Id. at 355.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 356-59. The effects of the enforcement of housing codes is
discussed in Ackerman, Regulating Slum Housing Markets on Behalf of the
Poor: Of Housing Codes, Housing Subsidies and Income Redistribution Policy,
80 YALE L.J. 1093 (1971). See also Komesar, Return to Slumville: A Critique
of the Ackerman Analysis of Housing Code Enforcement and the Poor, 82
YALE

L.J. 1175 (1973).

83. See R. POSNER, supra note 77, at 356.
84. See Bellow, supra note 35, at 122. Bellow writes:

[W]here such a "focused case" strategy is followed, illegal and exploitative practices that affect poor people can be changed.
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is moderated by the relationship between what is at stake and the
costs of getting it. The appetite for litigation will disappear as legal
expenses approach the value of the expected outcome. Because a
subsidized litigant does not operate under the same constraint,
there is always the possibility that his willingness to devote an indefinite amount of legal resources to a case will extort unjust
settlements.
A similar problem arises when the stakes of the parties in a
legal controversy are widely disparate. If an injured plaintiff in a
mass tort situation has only $1,000 at stake while the defendant is
worried about the res judicata effect of an adverse decision on
claims of a much larger amount, the willingness of the latter to
litigate may force a settlement for an amount well below the value
of the claim. Institutional litigants may thus often be able to
bring great pressure upon individual litigants because they have
more at stake."'
The ability to whipsaw opponents is present in some situations
involving publicly funded legal services. As a factual matter, abuses
do not appear to occur with great frequency, partly because legal
services programs have such limited resources spread over so many
potential cases. 80 An amendment to the statute now provides protection for those inconvenienced by frivolous suits.87
Arguments concerning the efficiency effects of the legal services
programs fail to reflect the benefits provided to poor people as a
so because they are often the product of cost calculations which are
radically altered when (a) confronted with a substantial number of
complainants; (b) with a real stake in the outcome; (c) who do not
have to absorb the attorney and other costs which would ordinarily be
involved in pursuing such grievances to completion. . . . [T]here is
a great deal of potential for organization and leverage for low-income
clients in systematically focusing intake and advocacy in individual
cases in this way.
Id.
85. See Galanter, Why the 'Haves' Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the
Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & Soc. REv. 95 (1974).
86. See Bellow, supra note 35, at 108-09, 119-22. Bellow describes the
actual practice of legal services programs as conforming to a "minimal helpmaximum numbers" approach which provides routinized and limited service
to as large a number of clients as possible. Id. at 110, 117. He severely
criticizes this approach, urging a more focused law-reform strategy that would
provide a much higher quality of service to a smaller group of clients. Id.
at 121-22.
87. See 42 U.S.C. § 2996d(f) (Supp. 1980). As amended, the statute provides that a defendant who prevails in an action brought by a legal services
program is entitled to an award of reasonable costs and legal fees incurred in
defense of the action if the court finds that the action was commenced or pursued for the sole purpose of harassment of the defendant or that the corporation
or the plaintiff maliciously abused legal process.
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class when small claims, uneconomic to be litigated individually by
any claimant, are pursued systematically on behalf of such persons
as consumers or tenants.8 8 Moreover, one of the great advantages of
the program is that substantial benefits accrue even to those who are
not represented. To the extent that legal rules and procedures are
modified in favor of welfare recipients, consumers, tenants, and
other classes, everyone in the class, even those not eligible for free
legal services, is benefitted. By assisting a small proportion of poor
people, benefits are produced for a much larger group. Costs to the
same class may also rise, but the choice of enforcing or not enforcing legal rights should be left to litigants rather than decided in
the abstract by the social critic.
Supporters and critics of the legal services program do not
question its effectiveness as an instrument for enforcing the legal
rights of the poor.8 Both agree that it produces substantial results.
The criticisms, rather, are that the assertion of these claims tempts
judges to do things they shouldn't do, benefits lawyers more than
clients, or misallocates resources in the community.9 0
Although the philosophical and economic objections of critics
such as Chapman and Posner raise serious questions, the political
opposition to the legal services program is based on its very success
and the erroneous perspective that views its law reform aspect as
more dominant than it really is. Lawyers who do a good job representing poor people inevitably will collide with the interests of
powerful business groups and government agencies; those who are
on the receiving end of these not-so-tender ministrations of justice
will usually not be pleased.
The claims brought by legal services programs on behalf of
poor people are decided by judges, not by legal services lawyers.
Approximately 85% of all matters are resolved favorably to the
program's clients, a remarkably high success rate. The rub about
88. See Brooke, Legal Services: Government at its Best, Wash. Star, Mar. 9,
1981, col. 3.
89. See Brill, Reagan Voters: Don't Read This, The American Lawyer, Oct.

1980. Brill describes the effectiveness of the legal services program in New

Haven, Connecticut: "Morrison's work punctures these myths [that government
poverty programs are ineffective] so clearly that Reagan should send a hit squad
after him." Id., col. 1. See also Cockburn & Ridgeway, Poor Law: The Attack
on Legal Services, Voice (Feb. 4, 1981), at 12, col. 1 ("Of all the liberal programs
generated by the reforming spasm of the 1960s, [the legal services program has]
been particularly successful, in terms of dollar value, effectiveness, and absence
of corruption."). Similarly, critics of the program emphasize the effectiveness

of the program in advancing what are perceived as ideological objectives. See
notes 3-6 and accompanying text supra.
90. See Taylor, supra note 7.
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the legal services program may be that it is successful, and its very
success creates opposition among interests adversely affected. "Political activism" and similar slogans may be code words for another
complaint: "their just claims have been upheld against us and we
resent it."
V. THE CURRENT CRISIS

In March 1981, a spokesman for the Office of Management and
Budget announced that the new Administration's budget for the
next fiscal year would not include any funds for the Legal Services
Corporation.9 1 President Reagan hopes to abolish the national
legal services program. The current situation is a parlous one for
several reasons. First, an appropriation for the Corporation must
be approved by October 1st in order for it to receive any money
in fiscal year 1982.92 Given the disarray of the economy and the
strength of the popular sentiment to cut both taxes and expenditures, Congress may be expected to give considerable deference to
the President's recommendation that legal services are an appropriate area in which to make cuts. Second, the legislative authorization for the Corporation expires this year and new legislation
authorizing appropriations for future years must be enacted if the
program is to continue. 93 Even though the program has substantial support in the House of Representatives, the road ahead looks
rocky in the more conservative Senate and bleak indeed if it becomes necessary to muster a two-thirds vote to overcome a presidential veto. Third, President Reagan will have an early opportunity to replace all eleven members of the Corporation's board of
directors and, even if he fails in his effort to eliminate the program
entirely, it may be reshaped out of recognition if unsympathetic
board members are nominated by the President and confirmed by
91. See note 1 and accompanying text supra.
92. The annual budget cycle must result in enactment of an appropriation
bill containing budget authority for expenditures for the Legal Services Corporation for fiscal year 1982, beginning October 1, 1981. If the appropriations
process is not completed at that time, a continuing resolution to continue
spending until the appropriations process is completed is always a possibility.
See Jackson & Merry, Special In'terests Fear Congress Will Approve Most of
Reagan's Cuts, Wall St. J., Feb. 20, 1981, at 1, col. 6 (considerable legislative
deference will be given to presidential recommendations).
93. See H.R. 2506, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). This bill would extend
the Legal Services Corporation. Hearings on the bill were held in March 1981
before the Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of
Justice of the House Committee on the Judiciary.
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the Senate. 4 In short, the legal services program is now fighting
for its life on a number of fronts.
The threats to the program may bring about any of three alternative fates: termination, transformation, or slow, painful death.
Brief remark on each is appropriate.
A. Termination
As previously indicated, President Reagan seeks to abolish the
current program, leaving nothing in its place. Members of the private bar would once again assume collective responsibility for
meeting the legal needs of the poor. Non-federal funds now available for legal services, estimated at about $48 million in a recent
year, might continue to flow to legal services organizations; 95 and
strenuous fundraising efforts at the state and local level might expand this total somewhat.
If termination of federal funding occurs, the legal services program will revert to the situation prevailing prior to 1965: traditional
legal aid on the charity model. The American bar would then be
faced with the tremendous challenge of meeting the most essential
needs through volunteered services and financial contributions.
B. Transformation
Two major alternatives have been advanced that would transform the legal services program. One would abolish the Corporation as a governing body and funding conduit, and allow states to
94. See Ranii & Bourne, supra note 2, at 1, col. 1. In addition to failing
to obtain confirmation of five nominees in 1980, President Carter also established an undesirable precedent by ignoring the spirit of the statutory requirement that "no more than six [members of the board] shall be of the same
political party." See 42 U.S.C. § 2996c(a) (1976). During the Carter years very
few Republicans were appointed to the board; except for a few members, the
Board consisted of Democrats and independents who had been active in the
Carter campaign. With the change in the composition of the Senate in the
1980 election, President Reagan is not likely to encounter the difficulties faced
by President Ford in nominating persons who were perceived by Senate liberals
as unsympathetic to the objectives of the federal legal services program. For
a discussion of the difficulties encountered by President Ford, see Arnold, supra
note 23.

95. See LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION, DELIVERY SYSTEMS STUDY: A RESEARCH
PROJECT ON THE DELIVERY OF LEGAL SERVICES TO THE POOR. This study reported that in 1976, 67% of total funds expended by legal services programs
for civil legal assistance came from the Legal Services Corporation. Id. Almost
two-thirds of the non-Corporation

funding also came from federal sources.

Funds from state and local governments and from private sources provided
only about 9% of total funding.
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devote a portion of a federal block grant to legal services.0 6 Under
this proposal, the administration of a large number of human-service
programs would be transferred to the states under a block grant.
No funds would be included in the initial block grant for legal
services, and all of the transferred programs would be reduced by
25% .97
Each state would decide whether and how much support would
be provided for legal services. Badly needed health and human
services programs would compete against each other for shares in a
smaller pie, with legal services prejudiced in this competition by
the fact that it had contributed nothing to the kitty to be divided.
For legal services, adoption of this approach would end the national
program, lead to highly variable and inconsistent state responses,
and probably result in partial or total elimination. In states in
which legal services has a high priority vis-a-vis the programs with
which it would be competing, strong local programs might continue.
It is not apparent that lumping legal services with programs
combatting high blood pressure and rat infestation is a desirable
course. Legal services are unique in many respects and, in my view,
more important than many of these social service programs. History also suggests that turning over the future of the program to
state officials would reinstitute the political interference that
hampered the OEO programs. 98 Disputes of the poor with public
officials who make decisions about their housing, welfare, health
care, and the like would be communicated to the state officials
passing on legal service funding. The Legal Services Corporation
was created in large part to provide independence from political
pressures of the kind this would involve.
A second proposal for the transformation of the legal services
program is also lurking in the wings. This is a substitution, in
whole or part, of a judicare system for the current staff-attorney
system. 99 Judicare, the legal analog to medicare, involves the provision of legal services to eligible clients by members of the private
bar, who are then paid by the government for their services. A
study by a Reagan transition team recommended a move to judicare,
coupling it with a funding cut, the abolition of support centers,
96. See MacKerron, Legal Services Corp. Supporters Fear It May be 'Block
Granted' to Death, NAT'L. J., Feb. 28, 1981, at 358-60; Freivogel, U.S. Plan
Readied To Replace Legal Aid, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Mar. 1, 1981.
97. See Ranii & Bourne, supra note 2, at 1, col. 2.
98. See note 26 and accompanying text supra. See also Turner, Proposal
by Reagan Opens an Old Wound, N.Y. Times, Mar. 15, 1981, col. 1.
99. See Cockburn & Ridgeway, supra note 89, at 13, col. 2.
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and legislation restricting both eligibility and representation. 0°
The study recommended that the portion of the Corporation budget
devoted to judicare be increased from less than 1% now to 15%
next year, 35% the following year, and 50% the year after.
The questions of organizational structure and relative efficiency
raised by a judicare alternative are complex and controversial. 10 1
This is not the place for a full exploration of them. My view is
that a complete legal services program would have staff attorney
and judicare components, since each has some advantages. In some
sparsely settled areas, reliance on private attorneys may be necessary,
and for some routine problems such as divorces, bankruptcies, and
the like, private attorneys may be able to perform the tasks at least
as efficiently, leaving the staff attorneys to provide more specialized
legal services for poor people. It is one thing, however, to add a
judicare supplement to the existing programs, and quite another to
dismember the existing staff attorney program, which is operating
effectively, for an uncertain merger with judicare at lower funding
levels.
The politics of judicare are troublesome because the organized
bar, which is the most active lobbyist for legal services, is divided
on the subject. Large firm lawyers tend to support the existing
staff-attorney system, while solo practitioners and small firm lawyers,

who feel increasingly threatened by the many changes affecting the
legal profession, are very supportive of judicare. Under pressure
from some state bars and its own general practice section, the ABA
recently adopted a resolution urging Congress to amend the Act
"to mandate the opportunity for substantial involvement of private
lawyers in providing legal services for the poor." 102 This ambiguously worded resolution includes pro bono involvement of the private bar as well as compensated services, and in this form it is receiving the wholehearted support of the Legal Services Corporation.
It seems likely that language along the lines of the ABA resolution,
if not stronger, will be included in the Act if the reauthorization
legislation is enacted this year.
100. See note 4 supra.
101. For the views of the Legal Services Corporation, see THE DELIVERY
A POLICY REPORT TO THE CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE
(June 1980). For other views, see Brakel, Styles of Delivery of
Legal Services to the Poor: A Review Article, 1977 AM. B. FOUNDATION RES. J.
219, criticizing Earl Johnson's views as expressed in the first part of M. CAPPELLETrI. J. GORDLEY & E. JOHNSON, TOWARD EQUAL JUSTICE: A COMPARATIVE
STUDY OF LEGAL AID IN MODERN SOCIETIES 140-90 (1975).
SYSTEMS STUDY:
UNITED STATES

102. 66 A.B.A.J. 1058 (Sept. 1980).
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C. Slow, Painful Death
If the challenges described above are not immediately fatal,
slow, painful death may be the fate of the national legal services
program through: 1) drastic reductions in funding; 2) crippling
restrictions on the types of cases that may be undertaken or the
scope of representation; or 3) harassment from an unsympathetic
governing board.
1. Funding
The outlook for funding for fiscal 1982, assuming the continuance of the program, is not hopeful. Newspaper reports have
mentioned $100 million as a likely Senate figure for the Corporation's appropriation next year; this amount should be compared
with current funding of $321 million.10 3 A cut of $221 million
would have disastrous effects on the scope and quality of the existing program.
A funding cut of this size would probably require the elimination of all training activities, the support centers, the Reginald
Heber Smith program, some special programs, and a reduction of
all field programs to approximately one-third of their current level.
It would lead to bitter internal quarrels among client groups, such
as those representing migrants and welfare recipients, and between
staff components of each program. Most of the attorneys and staff
would have to be fired. The disastrous effect on morale would also
tend to lessen the quality of the remaining program. Programs
would be unable to undertake new cases or hire new staff members,
and all of their energy would have to be devoted to completing
work on present cases.
The funding outlook in the House of Representatives, however,
is substantially more favorable toward legal services. There is a
possibility that the House and Senate conferees will negotiate an
appropriations figure somewhere between $100 million and $260
million.
2. Crippling Restrictions
Another mode of attack on legal services is to cripple it with
demeaning or inappropriate restrictions. Current hearings in the
House of Representatives on the reauthorization are exploring a
variety of restrictions on the persons eligible for service, the types of
cases that may be undertaken, the scope of representation, and
103. The Corporation request for fiscal 1982 was $399.6 million; President
Carter's budget recommended $347 million.

News, Jan.-Feb. 1981, at 1.

See Legal Services Corporation
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similar limitations. The harmful effect of such restrictions turns
entirely on the content and effects of the particular restriction.
The Act has always contained restrictions on the availability
and type of service. Questions of policy in the provision of publiclyfunded services are appropriate for legislative resolution, especially
when choices as to who enjoys a social benefit must inevitably be
made. Examples of longstanding restrictions are those relating to
criminal cases and fee-generating cases, which prevent the use of
Corporation funds in situations in which representation is available
from other sources. 104 More controversial are present restrictions
on handling school desegregation cases, draft matters, abortion cases,
and cases involving homosexual rights.105 The ABA, the Corporation, and the legal services community have opposed such restrictions, 10 6 but the existing restrictions have not been especially
troublesome because their scope is so limited and most programs
are inactive in the areas involved.
During the reauthorization hearings in 1980, however, and
again in the current session, a number of restrictions were proposed
10 7
which would have a more substantial effect on the program.
Some of the major proposals are: exclusion of aliens or migrants
from representation,"' prohibition of class suits, 0 9 prohibition of
administrative or legislative representation," 0 and prohibition of
suits against governmental units or officers."' Any such restrictions
on service would be highly unfortunate. Here again, however,
there are substantial differences in relative effect. Exclusion of
service to aliens, for example, especially if limited to illegal aliens,
104. See 42 U.S.C. 2996f(b)(1) (1976) & 45 C.F.R. § 1609 (1980) (fee-generating
cases); 42 U.S.C. § 2996f(b)(1) & 45 C.F.R. § 1615 (1980) (criminal cases).

105. See 42 U.S.C. § 2996f(b)(8)-(10) (Supp. III 1979).
106. See H.R. REP. No. 96-996, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., at 9.

The report

notes:
A number of public witnesses, including the Corporation, the
American Bar Association, the Project Advisory Group and the
National Clients Council, testified on the general subject of restrictions on representation of legal services clients ....

The basic

thrust of the testimony heard by the subcommittee was that all such
restrictions should be removed from the Act, because they tend to
reinforce the belief among both clients and lawyers that the practice
of publicly-supported legal services law is a second class practice. ...
Id.
107. See Freivogel, supra note 4, at 11, col. 1; MacKerron, supra note 96,
at 358-60.
108. MacKerron, supra note 96, at 358, col. 2.
109. HERITAGE FOUNDATION, supra note 3, at 17.
110. Freivogel, supra note 4, at 11, col. 1.
11I. HERITAGE FOUNDATION, supra note 3, at 17.
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would not be disastrous and could be justified as expressing a legislative priority concerning the use of a scarce public resource.
Because of the political sensitivity concerning class actions,
there has been a great deal of discussion of a broad prohibition of
the use of this procedural device by legal services lawyers. 112 Some
opponents of the legal services program appear to suggest that withdrawal of this weapon would eliminate impact litigation. They
are uninformed or engaged in wishful thinking. Prohibiting class
suits would have some adverse consequences on the program, but
it would not eliminate law reform through impact litigation. This
is so because individual cases against the same defendants would
have much the same effect as class suits: the rules of stare decisis
and res judicata would extend the benefits of one poor person's suit
to others similarly situated.
The effects of a restriction of this kind would be more symbolic
than practical. Concerning practical effects, discovery might be
somewhat more limited in an action brought by an individual
plaintiff than it would be in one brought on behalf of a class, and
the contempt sanction for violation of a decree would not be as
readily available. Each of these effects is relatively minor.
The real cost of a class action restriction is symbolic: the attorneys who represent the poor would not be able to employ the
same armory of procedural devices that are available to other litigants. This pointed message would adversely affect the morale and
self-image of legal services lawyers, who already feel besieged, and
who are working for low salaries in unfavorable and often hostile
environments. Statutory restrictions that prevent them from providing the complete and zealous representation that the Code of
Professional Responsibility requires 113 - and that is available to
other litigants - reinforces an image of second-class citizenship for
themselves and their clients.
Of the possible restrictions listed above, the ones most damaging to the effective operation of the program and to any semblance
of equal justice under the law are those which would prohibit suits
against governmental units and all forms of legislative representation before legislatures and administrative bodies concerning statutes
and rules affecting the poor. These restrictions would destroy the
legal services program as we now know it.
112. Id.; notes 84-90 and accompanying text supra.

113. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (August 1977): Canon
6: "A lawyer should represent a client competently." Canon 7: "A lawyer
should represent a client zealously within the bounds of the law."
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3. Unsympathetic Board
As previously indicated, President Reagan will have an early
opportunity to appoint all eleven members of the board of directors
of the Legal Services Corporation." 4 This oddity, given the statutory policy of staggering board appointments over a three-year
period, resulted from the failure of the Carter Administration' to
obtain reappointment of the five board members whose terms expired in July of 1980.115 Since the terms of the remaining six
board members expire during the summer of 1981, an entirely new
board may be in place by the fall.
Since the board appoints the president of the Corporation,
who in turn controls the staff of the Corporation, a dramatic change
in the attitudes of the board would have immediate repercussions
on the Corporation's staff. Moreover, the board has large, if not
well defined, authority to issue regulations interpreting the Act and
its provisions." 6 The establishment of national priorities and imposition of restrictions through Corporation regulations are a distinct possibility.
Despite the ominous quality of these dark clouds, I refuse to
be a pessimist. The legal services program has a proud record,
and it has many friends. The ideological conservatives who oppose
it are profoundly ignorant of it. I believe that they, along with
the millions of Americans who are unfamiliar with the program
and open-minded about it, can be educated concerning its goals
and achievements. The broad middle ground of American politics,
I believe, will support the integrity of the program when the facts
are known.
James Kilpatrick, the conservative columnist, illustrates this
point. When I began my service as chairman of the Corporation
board, Kilpatrick was writing regular columns attacking the Corpo114. See note 94 and accompanying text supra.
115. See 42 U.S.C. §2996c(b) (1976) (setting terms of office for Board
members).
116. The Board is authorized to establish general policies for the Corporation. Id. § 2996d. Its powers in funding recipients and in engaging in
research, training, and information activities are stated in general terms in
§ 2996e(a). Section 2996e(b) authorizes the Corporation to "insure the compliance of recipients and their employees with the provisions of this subchapter and the rules, regulations, and guidelines promulgated pursuant to"
it, but termination or defunding of recipients is subject to procedural safeguards. See id. § 2996j. The specification of a number of requirements that
the Corporation is to implement and enforce in making grants and contracts
impliedly limits the Board's authority to impose other or differing requirements.
See id. § 2996f. The extent of the Corporation's authority to establish national
priorities and restrict eligibility is largely undetermined.
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ration and the legal services program, but the force of reason has
changed his mind. In mid-1980 Kilpatrick wrote:
[W]hen the bill to create the Legal Services Corporation
was pending in Congress, I was among many conservatives
who fought it to the last ditch. [The Corporation's predecessor, the OEO] had become a playpen for happy hot
dogs fresh out of law school.
-

. . [W]hile a few of the hot dogs still romp through

the law here and there, the Legal Services Corp. has proved
itself a tremendous force for good in our society. Nothing
rankles like injustice. The poor person who feels that he
has been denied his day in court suffers a wound that never
heals. The corporation hasn't wrought miracles in its first
five years, but those who know of its quiet, unpretentious
labors will wonder how our system of justice survived so
11
long without it.

Although some backsliding from this support of the Corporation is
evident in a more recent column, Kilpatrick continues to support
the ideal of publicly funded legal aid." 8
VI. WHY LEGAL SERVICES FOR THE POOR?

The legal services program is commonly viewed by its proponents, as well as its critics, as a mechanism for redistribution of
social wealth to the poor." 9 There are three difficulties with this
view: 1) economic theory often denies that changing a legal rule
will have the effect of redistributing income within the larger community; 2) the redistribution theory invites courts to decide issues
that are more properly left to resolution by policy makers; and 3)
it is inconsistent with the facts, both in respect to the bulk of the
activities of legal service programs and in its overestimation of the
capacity of litigation to perform such dramatic changes in economic
well-being.
These arguments have been touched upon at other points in
this paper, so I offer only a brief recap at this point. Global changes
such as large-scale redistribution of income within the community
cannot be accomplished by lawsuit except in rare and limited situa117. Kilpatrick, When Hot Dogs Help, NATION'S BUSINESS 13, 14 (July 1980).
See also Kilpatrick, Of Justice for All, Wash. Star, June 10, 1980, § A, at 11,
col. I.

118. Kilpatrick, Legal Services: Death by Suicide, Universal Press Syndicate,
Mar. 14, 1981.

119. See E.

JOHNSON,

supra note 16, at 235-84 (1974) (arguing that civil

legal assistance is an effective instrument in redistributing wealth to poor

people). See also notes 3-6 and accompanying text supra.
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tions. 120 The cooperation and action of legislative bodies is required for accomplishments of this character. Usually the power
of the fisc is required; and this remains an area from which courts
are almost totally excluded. Moreover, unforeseen consequences
as well as political retaliation are often associated with efforts to do
the impossible through court order. For example, studies indicate
that the long effort in several states to require landlords to comply
with building codes has tended to reduce the supply of low income
housing and increase its price, leaving a doubt about whether poor
people were the victors or the victims of the engagement. 121 In general, as Milton Friedman has said, there is no such thing as a free
22

lunch.1

I confess to some hope that legal services attorneys will moderate
their social change rhetoric and eschew cases that really belong in
the political realm. I was not pleased, for example, to read that
our new attorney general, William French Smith, reportedly is upset
because a legal services program in California, CLRA, has sued the
University of California, which Mr. Smith serves as a regent, for
sponsoring research into heavy agricultural machinery which allegedly reduces employment opportunities for farm labor. 123

I know

very little about the case and this ignorance must qualify my remarks, but it strikes me as the kind of problem that deserves resolution through the political process rather than in the courts. Perhaps
the University of California should change its research policies so
that more effort is directed to the needs of farm laborers or small
120. Marc Galanter sums up a large number of studies in the following
sentences:
Legal professionals have tended to overestimate the benefits that
could be delivered through obtaining rule-changes from eminent
institutions, especially from courts. A vast literature has documented
the constantly rediscovered and never-quite-believed truths that judicial ... pronouncements do not change the world; that the benefits of
such changes do not penetrate automatically and costlessly to their
intended beneficiaries; that often they do not benefit the latter at all.
We have some notion of why rule-changes produced by courts are
particularly unlikely to be important sources of redistributive change.
. . Like everything else, favorable rules are resources and those who
enjoy disproportionate shares of other resources tend also to reap the
benefit of rules.

Galanter, Delivering Legality: Some Proposals for the Direction of Research,
11 LAW & Soc. REv. 225, 228-29 (1976). See also Hazard, Law Reforming in
the Anti-Poverty Effort, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 242 (1970).
121. See note 82 and accompanying text supra.
122. M. FRIEDMAN, THERE'S No SUCH THING AS A FREE LUNCH (1975).
123. For a discussion of the Attorney General's reaction to this case, see
Cockburn : Ridgeway, supra note 89, at 12, col. 2. See also Taper, The

Bittersweet Harvest - Machines on Trial: Has the Mechanization of American
Agriculture Gone Too Far?, SCIENCE, Nov. 1980, at 79-84.
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farmers; perhaps the U.S. Department of Agriculture, which supplies the research funds involved in this controversy, should modify
its funding policies in the same direction; and perhaps either the
state or the federal legislature should move in the same direction.
These are arguable questions of public policy, but why are they
submitted to a court in a highly publicized law suit? As the Los
Angeles Times commented in an editorial entitled Trying to Hold
Back Tomorrow: "CLRA forgot to name progress as a codefendant." 124
It is inevitable in a decentralized legal services system, which
leaves the judgments about allocation of resources and selection of
clients to the local programs, that a few highly publicized situations
of this kind will cause embarrassment and difficulty for the legal
services program as a whole. My view is that the virtues of decentralized decision-making, responsive to local interests and communities, is far better than any attempt on a national level to spell
out detailed priorities. Usually the judgments made by local programs will be sound ones. And the virtues of a responsive decentralized system vastly exceed the costs of occasional instances of
poor judgment.
So far, my justification for publicly-funded legal services has
been negative in character, expressing doubts that broad claims of
social justice are an achievable and appropriate goal of the national
legal services program. But much of a positive nature needs to be
said as to why publicly-funded legal assistance for the poor is an
essential buttress of our enduring values. The arguments will be
marshalled under three heads: 1) access to justice, 2) the bias of law
against the unrepresented, and 3) helping individuals to help
themselves.
A. Access to Justice
Provision of legal services for the poor is a conservative program in the sense that it helps preserve the enduring values of our
republican form of government - access to justice on reasonably
equal terms, and due process and equal justice for all. The program provides living proof that our ideal of the blind lady with the
scales is not a figment of the imagination; she is really there and is
prepared to give a fair shake to the poor and the oppressed.
The courts are not merely another social institution; they provide the essential confirmation that our legal rights are real, meaningful, and enduring. On some occasions, an individual needs to
resort to the courts for relief; on other occasions, one needs a lawyer
124. See Taper, supra note 116, at 84.
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to conduct an adequate defense or prosecution of a claim. Political
liberty requires access to the courts as much as it requires access to
the voting booths. Provision of such access supplies a further reason
why citizens may be expected to resort to political or legal processes
for orderly change rather than to the violent and disruptive path of
self-help reflected by the call, "to the barricades." James Kilpatrick,
the conservative columnist, has put it well:
If there is one concept that our nation cherishes more
than any other, it is the commitment that is carved in stone
at the Supreme Court. The legend reads, "Equal Justice
Under Law." Year by year we creep a little closer toward
that distant goal.

.

.

.

[I]n the nature of things, poor

families can accept the realities of being poor; they are not
going to have the food, clothing, housing, higher education
and material amenities of the rich. What they cannot accept is the sense of being unfairly ground down by the
millwheels of the law.
We never will achieve the ideal of truly equal justice.
Outside the antiseptic realms of mathematics, literal equality does not exist and ought not to exist. But at law, we
must keep trying. The preamble to the Constitution
pledges a national purpose "to establish justice." Let us
1 25
get on with the job.

B. The Bias of the Law Against the Unrepresented
The legal services program improves legal rules and procedures
so that poor people get a fairer break. The thought behind this
assertion is the reality that all of our institutions tend to respond to
the interests that are present and represented. Just as regulatory
agencies, if they are closeted with industry representatives for a
period of years are frequently captured by them, 12 6 so legislatures,
courts, and administrative bodies respond to the viewpoints that are
presented and the arguments that are made.
Some people consider comments such as this subversive of
American institutions. In fact, it is paying our institutions a compliment to recognize that they are responsive to the people. But to
what people? In general, to those who make their views known.
If, for example, all cases involving borrowers and finance companies were collection suits brought by well-represented creditors
against unrepresented debtors, the law in the area would be skewed
125. See Kilpatrick, Of Justice for All, supra note 117, at 11.
126. See Cramton, supra note 77, at 528-30.
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toward the creditor interests. Representation of even a small portion of debtors will have a remarkably salutary effect. The most
egregiously unfair rules will be eliminated immediately, and intelligent law reform will take place on more closely balanced issues.
The development of sound common law precedent is dependent
upon adversary presentation of facts and arguments; if one side of
a controversy is repeatedly unrepresented, the quality of decisions
will suffer.
Legal services for the poor offer an effective and efficient
remedy. It is an efficient remedy because it is not essential that
representation be provided to every tenant, consumer, borrower or
the like in order for beneficient effects to be felt. Provision of
legal services for some of the poor changes rules and procedures
that benefit everyone in the affected class, even those who are not
poor. There is a tension, of course, between the idea that the legal
services program is primarily delivery of routine "nuts-and-bolts"
legal services to the poor and the economic arguments that the cases
brought have a significance that goes far beyond the needs of the
particular litigants. A degree of tension between goals is often
beneficial and stimulating. Controls in local programs, reinforced
by national policies, can retain a client-oriented focus that prevents
staff attorneys from engaging in random forays against windmills
of their devising. And there are both political (increased respect
for the law) and economic (improved efficiency in the disputeresolution process) reasons that justify provision of services whose
cost may often exceed what a middle-class litigant would pay for
the services.
C. Helping the Hurt and Suffering
Finally, in a society that values the dignity of the individual,
the role of legal services in helping the poor to help themselves
must remain the basic justification. The legal services program
helps bring justice to individuals who are hurt, troubled, unfortunate and dispossessed. What further justification is required other
than: "Because they need it and they are important?"
A short time ago Colman McCarthy of the Washington Post
devoted a column to the memory of a Catholic woman, who had
devoted her life to the service of the poor:
Miss Day had spent most of her 83 years in the simplest but rarest form of humane service: feeding, clothing and housing whoever of the earth's wretched came to
her. "We confess to being fools," she said once about her-
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self and her small band of pacifists and personalists, "and
we wish we were more so."
* . * Dorothy Day argued that the problem of poverty
was its being left too much to professional problem-solvers.
People with empty bellies got turned into Profound Questions, with poverty brokers on the hunt for Profound
Answers. In seminar after seminar and report after report,
the poor are given the bum's rush. In the end, as Miss
Day said, "there are too few who will consider themselves
servants, who will give up their lives to serve others."
' * * Dorothty Day used her faith as a buffer against
burnout and despair. Fittingly, it will have to be taken
on faith that her life of service made a difference. She
issued no progress reports on neighborhood improvement,
summoned no task forces on how to achieve greater efficiency on the daily soup line. Nor did she ever run
"follow-up studies" on whether the derelicts of the Bowery
renounced their drunken and quarrelsome ways. As her
favorite saint, Theresa of Lisieux, taught, results don't
matter to the prayerful.
At [Miss Day's] requiem mass, the prayers for the dead
were joyously sung.

A conviction was shared .

.

.

that

here was one of Christ's faithful - one who full-heartedly
followed what she called, "the strange upside-down teaching of the Gospel." The mourning poor best understood:
this life of exquisite foolishness made absolute sense. 127
Can we save the world by providing free legal services to the
poor? Surely not, because history tells us that the use of litigation,
backed by the coercive power of the state, will not produce heaven
on earth. And there will be abuses as in the exercise of all power
over others. But we can bring a little light into the lives of
others - and some self-respect into our own - if we devote at least a

portion of our time to what is ultimately important: improving
the lot of others.
127. McCarthy, A Life of Exquisite 'Foolishness', Wash. Post, Dec. 3,
1980, §A, at 19.
EDITOR'S NoTE: For historical purposes, it should be noted that the fourth
Donald A. Giannella Memorial Lecture was delivered on April 10, 1980 by
the late Monrad G. Paulsen, then Dean and Vice-President for Legal Education
at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law of Yeshiva University. Publication
of the lecture, entitled "The Fundamentals of American Criminal Procedure,"
was prevented by Dean Paulsen's untimely death.
For an interesting commentary reflecting on Dean Paulsen's views of legal
education, see Graetz & Whitebread, Monrad Paulsen and the Idea of a
University Law School, 67 VA. L. REv. 445 (1981).
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